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Abstract—In recent years the use of digital communication has 
increased. This also increased the chance to find privileged data in 
the digital evidence. Privileged data is protected by law from 
viewing by anyone other than the client. It is up to the digital 
investigator to handle this privileged data properly without being 
able to view the contents. Procedures on handling this information 
are available, but do not provide any practical information nor is 
it known how effective filtering is. The objective of this paper is to 
describe the handling of privileged data in the current digital 
forensic tools and the creation of a script within the digital forensic 
tool Nuix. The script automates the handling of privileged data to 
minimize the exposure of the contents to the digital investigator. 
The script also utilizes technology within Nuix that extends the 
automated search of identical privileged document to relate files 
based on their contents. A comparison of the ‘traditional’ ways of 
filtering within the digital forensic tools and the script written in 
Nuix showed that digital forensic tools are still limited when used 
on privileged data. The script manages to increase the effectiveness 
as direct result of the use of relations based on file content.   
Keywords—Nuix; digital evidence; privileged data; digital 
forensic tool;  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
One of the problems in digital investigations is the increasing 
amount of data required to investigate, as storage capacity of 
individual devices and the number of devices seized per 
household increase [1, 2]. This is due to the current trend of the 
digitalization of society, where computing and digital 
communication is everywhere [3], and storage is rapidly 
becoming cheaper [4]. 
The transformation from paper to digital is also setting in on 
practices where the digital contents are restricted by government 
laws. Privileged data, such as an e-mail conversation between a 
lawyer and its client is not to be viewed by third parties. But law 
enforcement may encounter such information stored on a 
suspect’s seized computer or the e-mail database export from a 
company. 
A police department in the Netherlands has three dedicated 
teams appointed with the task of investigating large scale 
financial and economical fraud cases. These investigations often 
take years to complete due to the complexity that is introduced. 
This is due to the large amount of information that is required to 
analyze in order to find the criminal activity, which is often 
concealed. 
Within these investigations, a team is involved which 
consists of tactical investigators, specialized financial 
investigators and a digital investigator. The task of the digital 
investigator is to analyze the physical and digital evidence for 
information related to the committed crime. 
It is stated that the origin of money can be traced, thus it 
should be easy to find the original source of money that is 
derived from criminal activities. Unfortunately, criminal 
activities are more organized, more sophisticated with the help 
of professional experts. The money can flow through an 
international network of companies (or corporations) established 
in countries where there is no law that criminalizes the original 
crime or where there is no collaboration between the involved 
countries, which makes the paper trail hard to follow. 
In many cases our suspects were helped with the 
establishment of their companies by advisors such as lawyers, 
notaries, accountants or tax consultants. They provided these 
complex services as this is their profession and do not have to be 
part of the criminal activity. However, their services could be 
used in order to create the money laundering construction. 
Within the Netherlands and most other parts of the world [4], 
these professions have a specialized status regarding the 
information they work with from their profession: it’s 
privileged. All forms of communication that are created, send to 
or from a person that has the right of privileged communication 
may not be viewed by anyone else than the persons for whom 
the communication was intended. This includes law 
enforcement, except under very exceptional circumstances. 
During any investigation, often tens of terabytes data are 
seized in total millions of files. The chance that one of these files 
is privileged is always present. 
Currently there are procedures written by different parties 
describing how to handle privileged information when it is 
encountered in the physical and digital evidence. It is very likely 
that these procedures are written based on the requirements by 
law, but do they match the possibilities that are given by the 
digital forensic tools used to view the digital evidence? Some of 
these tools have the possibility to block further viewing of files, 
but they are not all suitable for cases where it is required to block 
privileged files. The implementation of such functionality is left 
to the developer of the forensic software and has often a limited 
usability as discussed further in this research. 
After encountering a privileged file, a search is made within 
the forensic tool based on very limited amount of information 
given by a privileged officer (a different person then the digital 
investigator) may see of the document. This is often no more 
than a header of a letter or the email address from or to whom 
the email is send. The results of these searches are tested again 
for privileged information and, where applicable, the files from 
the result are blocked for further viewing within the case. This 
approach is very limited and imprecise due to the lack of 
information to create a filter that consists of quality information 
to find the relevant privileged data. 
This approach to filtering the evidence requires a lot of time 
spend on searching, filtering and blocking the files from 
viewing. The process is often done on very large datasets which 
require a large amount of time before the results of each step is 
presented within the forensic software. In this paper, we aim to 
answer the following research questions:  
• What are the possibilities of common digital forensic 
software tools regarding the blocking of privileged 
information? 
• Can relevant privileged data be filtered based on content, 
other than the limited amount of information available 
due to the superficially analysis restriction that the law 
enforces when reviewing privileged data? 
• Can the process of searching, filtering and blocking items 
be automated in order to save time and be more efficient? 
Some digital forensic software tools such as FTK and Nuix 
already have been provided with the possibility of blocking the 
information from further viewing. Nuix also provides extended 
possibilities to relate files together based not only on their 
cryptographic signature but also by their content. The 
contribution of this paper is a Nuix script that can: 
• Find duplicate, related and derived files based on a 
starting position, such as a selected item or an e-mail 
address. 
• Block these files from further viewing. 
• Export the privileged files, including a generated 
summary file list, so that the privileged files can be 
reviewed if their status is truly privileged. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II 
shows the background on legal professional privilege and the 
removing data from a forensic image. We present our method to 
identify privileged documents in Section III. We describe our 
process and script in Section IV. We evaluate and analyze our 
approach in Section V. Finally, we conclude and discuss on 
future work in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Legal professional privilege 
Any person should be able, without constraints, to consult a 
lawyer, whose profession entails the giving of independent legal 
advice to all those in need of it. Legal Professional Privilege 
(LPP) is a general principle of law that describes the protection 
of all communication between a professional adviser and their 
client and the right of nondisclosure. The privilege can be 
waived by the client or the lawyer [6]. The recognition of 
privileged information exists since 1982 [5]. In addition to this 
privilege, there is also the derived privilege for individuals who 
are in the employ of, or work for, professionals entitled to 
privilege, and who thus, by virtue of their office, handle 
information that is privileged. Examples are a secretary in the 
employ of a civil law notary or an expert provided with 
information by a solicitor who is seeking a professional opinion. 
When examining seized digital information, a digital 
investigator may come across documents drawn up by solicitors 
or civil law notaries, who are all bound to secrecy and have the 
right of nondisclosure. The contents of the documents in 
question may not be passed on to the judicial authorities, other 
than what necessary to determine whether (parts of) these 
documents are privileged [7]. 
The law mentions letters, writing, and written documents, 
and in accordance with jurisprudence, this also applies to 
computer files [8]. The data carrier or forensic image, the 
container that holds the privileged data, is not privileged [9]. The 
problem with encountering files in forensic images is that it’s 
difficult to examine the files as separate entities as they are 
bound by the image file. Therefore, it is important to examine 
data carriers in such a way that the complainant's right of 
nondisclosure is maintained [10]. When it is reasonable to 
suspect that the digital evidence contains a lot of privileged data, 
there is the option to clean up the seized information before it is 
passed on to the investigating team. 
Besides, there is a problem with the identification of 
privileged documents: there is no identification requirement 
when documents are send outside of the privileged environment. 
The manual from the Dutch bar association with guidelines for 
electronic communications and the Internet [11] contains a 
Dutch translation of the directive regarding the handling e-mail 
and documents set in 2005 by the CCBE. It contains a chapter 
for using descriptive metadata [12] in documents in order to 
maintain the authenticity and to set parameters like the author, 
subject, the process of which the document is a product and the 
date. This metadata is however not used to mark a document as 
identifiable as written by a profession with a privileged status. 
B. Removing data from a forensic image 
A lot of effort is undertaken by the digital investigator to 
protect the digital evidence against invalidation [22]. Invalidated 
evidence because of a modification of the image could lead to 
the dismissal of any evidence that resided on the forensic image. 
Although every change can be documented in order to protect 
the chain-of-evidence, it should not be common practice to break 
the forensic integrity that the imaging software provides. 
Privileged data might be a reason why it would be required to 
remove files from a forensic image. As described in chapter 2.1, 
the official procedure for removing privileged data states that, if 
possible, a copy of the image should be made excluding the 
privileged files. 
When a privileged document is found within the physical 
evidence, it is taken out of the evidence, placed inside an 
envelope and transferred to the privileged officer for review. The 
original physical evidence remains intact and there is no 
question that the investigative team had any possible way of 
viewing the contents of the document other than the possible 
header by the person who found it. 
By removing the privileged data from the forensic image in 
the same principle as in the physical evidence, the possibility of 
reading the privileged data in a digital forensic tool or in the 
image itself is removed. 
Possibility of removing data from an image: A possible way 
in order to remove data from an image is to load the RAW disk 
image into a hex editor such as HxD [13] and manually 
overwrite the sectors on the image where the privileged data 
resides. The altered image can be saved as a copy. 
Digital forensic tools:  It will be most likely that privileged 
data is found during the investigation of an image in a digital 
forensic tool. After the image is cleaned of any privileged data, 
the image should be used as new source within the forensic tools. 
It might be possible to redirect forensic software tools to use the 
altered image. This could lead to some unforeseen problems 
such as unstable software when a piece of removed information 
which is no longer available is requested by the forensic 
software in the altered image. An index database, such as that 
used by the forensic software FTK [14], will still contain the 
metadata of an e-mail such as the sender and receiver, subject 
and dates until it is regenerated. Removing the privileged data 
from an image and re-indexing the new image every time a new 
privileged document is found would take an extensive amount 
of time, while the end result by using a filter in the forensic tools 
would often suffice to hide the information. 
Forensic format: Forensic images are often stored in the 
Expert Witness Format (E01) because of the disk space it can 
save when the compression is used [15]. The downside of 
compression is that the contents of the image cannot be viewed 
directly by a hex editor tool. The contents of the image must first 
be mounted as a writeable disk image or converted to a RAW 
disk image. 
Integrity: Images made from a storage device are created 
forensically sound and their integrity can be checked by a hash 
value that was calculated during the imaging process. When the 
content of the image is altered, the hash value of the image 
changes. Verifying the previously calculated hash will no longer 
result in a positive check. Another way of integrity testing must 
be applied. 
In the paper Protecting Digital Legal Professional Privilege 
(LPP) Data [16] the integrity issue is questioned from data that 
were removed from an image. The paper states that it is possible 
to verify the individual files on a logical level within the image. 
However, it is not possible to verify files on a physical level This 
physical level may still be of importance, for example when 
deleted files are recovered from the unallocated space. This 
information does not exist on a logical level. The paper states 
‘To overcome the problem, the simplest way is to pre-calculate 
all the physical sector hash of the original storage device and use 
that hash set to verify the physical level data at the modified 
image’. This would solve the problem of being unable to verify 
the data integrity after removing sectors containing privileged 
information. The problem of this verification method is that, 
during the writing of this paper, there were no software tools 
capable of running such a verification. 
Content containers:  There is a possibility that the privileged 
files will reside inside some form of container. Examples of 
these could be ZIP files, database files or a PST file containing 
e-mail. These files should be handled separately. It is vital to 
forensically extract the contents of the file and remove only the 
necessary data in order not to corrupt the container file itself and 
thus making all the contents unreadable. The extracted 
information could be provided separately to the altered image. 
Such a change would require testing in order to see what kind of 
information would be removed with the extraction. 
C. Nuix 
Nuix presents the Investigator Workstation as the main 
product for the Digital Forensic investigator: a single application 
built to process large volumes of data [17]. At the time of testing 
version 7.0.2. was available. NUIX provides a full list of the 
supported file types [18]. Support at that time for the required 
file types is present and images and PDF files can be processed 
with OCR in order to have their contents indexed. The 
Investigator Workstation has no multi-user environment and can 
therefore not block or hide files from other users. Files can be 
placed in an excluded list, where they will be excluded from 
searches, results view (a file list view) and document navigator 
(overview of the evidence files in tree-view). The privileged 
items moved to the excluded item section can still be seen when 
the excluded items section is specifically selected by the user. 
Nuix implemented technology (Shingles) that enables the 
comparison of identical documents in a way that the investigator 
could not: by comparing the contents of privileged data. The 
results are file relations between files that are not identical, but 
similar. For example, a Word document can be saved as PDF 
and contain the exact content, but with a different cryptographic 
hash identity. This file is very relevant, but there is a high chance 
it will be missed with the filtration process. 
To make use of this technology Nuix requires that evidence 
is processed with the option Enable near-duplicates enabled. 
When enabled, Nuix generates sets of shingles for each item it 
processes. A shingle is a series of phrases, typically five words 
with an overlap on either end [19]. 
Nuix’s ability to relate files based on shingles gives an 
automated process the possibility to potentially find more 
privileged files based on their contents. This gives an advantage 
over the other tools. 
III. IDENTIFICATION PATTERNS 
To identify privileged documents or to be able to chain 
together emails or documents in our context, it is required to 
define a set of patterns that can be used to create filters within 
the forensic software. 
Telephone number: The Dutch law has declared that since 
the 1st of September 2011 the following telephone numbers that 
are used by persons with a privileged profession must be 
recorded in a central database [23]: 
• The extension number of its fixed telephone 
• The extension number of the fax machine that is used 
only by the lawyer, other privileged holders or persons 
with a derivative of his privilege 
• The extension number of the secretary of the lawyer 
• The number of a fixed (separate) telephone in the home 
of the lawyer, provided this terminal is intended solely 
for business use. 
• When a phone number is being tapped and a call is made 
from or to a privileged phone number, the system that 
records the call will automatically remove calls made 
from these numbers. 
E-mail:  In contrast to the telephone number, there is no 
requirement for a person with a privileged profession to register 
his e-mail address or domain name officially. There is no 
possibility to check for privileged e-mail addresses. E-mail 
communication can be traced by the information present in the 
header. These headers contain, among other fields, the FROM 
and TO e-mail addresses of the sender and recipient(s) and might 
contain e-mail addresses in the CC and BCC fields. This 
information is interpreted by digital forensic tools and makes 
them available for searching. Finding relations between 
privileged files should not be done with the Carbon Copy (CC) 
and the Blind Carbon Copy fields. 
This concludes that we do not require to filter for privileged 
files when the privileged person is in the CC and the BCC will 
most likely be too unreliable for identification. The digital 
investigator should be aware of the following relations: 
• In the case of a privileged e-mail it should not be 
forgotten to block files attached to the original e-mail. 
• Filtering on the privileged email address could identify a 
lot more privileged e-mails. 
• After the email address is checked, a domain name check 
should give away if there was any derivative privileged 
communication. 
• In the case of a file, there should be a search throughout 
the case in order to find documents that are identical. 
This could be done based on the hash value of the file, 
which is often generated during the index process in the 
digital forensic software 
• There is a possibility that the content of a document is 
stored in another format. For example; the original Word 
version of a PDF might still be stored on the computer, 
but will not be found during a hash based search. Ideally 
the contents of the file should be tested against other 
documents for overlapping word phrases within the case. 
Keywords: To complete the search for privileged 
communication, a keyword search can be done. This search 
should include the following: 
• Full name: John Doe 
• Surname: Doe 
• Keywords that fulfil a certain probability: lawyer, notary, 
confidential, etc. 
A keyword based search will only be an advantage if the 
keywords are known and specific enough. The term lawyer is 
widely used on modern day computers by software packages 
that come with legal documents. In order to use keywords with 
privileged professions, it would require a source, e.g., a 
database, containing company names, e-mail addresses or 
telephone numbers of privileged communicators. Due to the 
typical precision/recall tradeoff in the field of information 
retrieval, certain broader queries could result in a large non-
relevant percentage of discovered documents in the result [20]. 
A proactive keyword search without very specific data that 
identifies privileged persons will result in false positives and 
could potentially remove evidence from the case. In 1985, an 
evaluation was conducted on the retrieval effectiveness of a full-
text document retrieval system [21]. The results where that less 
than 20 percent of the documents relevant to the particular 
search were retrieved. 
File relations: File relations can be used when a privileged 
file has been found, either through a search containing specific 
keywords or by stumbling upon it. It is recommended that the 
relationship to other files is expanded in order to view the 
possible chain of communication. A single privileged file might 
contain enough metadata to find the related files. A relation 
between different files can be made based on the metadata 
within a document, such as the FROM email address inside the 
header of an email or the Author metadata added to a Word 
document. These properties can be analysed without reading the 
contents of the file and used to expand the search for related 
documents. In Figure 1, a fragment is shown on how items could 
possibly relate to each other. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Public keys associated with the wallet’s transactions, which occurred 
as binary values in memory 
IV. PROPOSED PROCESS 
A proof-of-concept script for Nuix was written and outlined 
in this paper. Its goal is to automate the handling of privileged 
data. The script automates the process of searching, blocking and 
exporting privileged data. For a more thorough result, the script 
uses technology in Nuix to find object relations and compares 
file contents based on Shingles described in Section II.C. 
The script is to be called upon after finding an e-mail or 
document that contained privileged information. It is written to 
start from two scenarios: 
1. One or more items are found containing privileged 
information and the investigator is required to filter 
these from the case. These items are selected within the 
GUI and the script is started. 
2. The investigator has information that a certain e-mail 
address is used by a privileged user and wants to filter 
on this entry. 
The flowchart in Figure 2 represents a high-level workflow 
of the script. The script can be separated in three different stages; 
start-up, processing and export. Each of these steps will be 
explained in the following sub-sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. High-level workflow of the script 
A. Start-up 
Before the script is started, a few settings are required to 
start. These parameters allow to alter the result and output of the 
script in order to suite the requirements he or she might have. 
The script will set default parameters upon each start. 
The first step after the script has been started is a check if 
there are items in the case of the media type application/pdf that 
do not contain text within the Nuix database. Media Types 
(MIME types) are two-part identifiers for file formats and are 
used within Nuix to identify the type of a file. 
If unsearchable PDF documents are present in the case, a 
warning message is shown to the user that it is advised to run 
Optical Character Recognition over these items. Without this 
step, it is possible that unsearchable PDF documents are not 
matched as related, as their content cannot be read. 
Next, the user is required to enter data into three windows: 
1. The export directory will be used to store all the found 
privileged items. The script defaults to the user’s 
Desktop folder: 
~/Desktop/NUIX_PrivilegedItems_Export 
2. The required amount of shingles (file similarity) to 
apply during the search. The default is 0.9, which means 
that files are only related to each other if 90% of the file 
content is similar. 
3. Should the script create Custodians and Exclude lists for 
the items that will be found inside the Nuix case. A Nuix 
custodian is used to group items under a specified name. 
Items contained in a Nuix exclude list will be 
suppressed from the results view and the document 
navigator. This automatically means that they will also 
not appear during searches. This function is 
implemented to test-run the script without making any 
alterations to the Nuix case. The creation of a custodian 
and exclude list is the only alteration the script can make 
to the case. 
B. Processing 
If the script is started without the selection of one or more 
files in the Nuix GUI, it is assumed that the user wants to filter 
on an e-mail address. A popup window allows the user to enter 
this information. 
The script starts a search based on an e-mail address or 
selected files. The result of this search is placed inside a queue. 
For each item in the queue a search is started to find related files 
based on duplicates, near-duplicates and chained-duplicates. 
This related file search is based on the MD5 digest of a file and 
files that are above the resemblance threshold of shingles setting. 
In the case of e-mail, the related search is only performed on the 
FROM e-mail address. Individual files that were selected 
through the Nuix GUI are processed to find related items based 
on the same methods as use to find duplicates in e-mail, as can 
be seen in Figure 3. 
  
Fig. 3. Script processing workflow 
 During development tests, it was discovered that evidence 
could be flagged privileged while this was not the case. This 
happened when a relation search was performed on the TO e-
mail address. For example; when a suspect sends an e-mail with 
multiple users in the TO field and one of these recipients is our 
filter e-mail address, all the e-mails to the non-privileged users 
will be flagged privileged because their content is the same. 
Therefore, the file related search runs only on the FROM 
(privileged) e-mail address. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the investigator does not get to see 
any information such as the subject of an e-mail. Everything is 
handled outside the view of the investigator. When all items are 
processed, items are assigned to custodian- and exclude lists, if 
the user has required this in the start-up configuration. 
Fig. 4. A part of the script output when processing an e-mail address 
C. Exporting 
The Nuix API contains a function that can convert each item 
into a PDF representation. This function is applied by the script 
to generated PDF files that can easily be viewed by a third party 
without the requirement of any digital forensic software. 
The generated PDF files are stored with filenames that are 
derived from an incremental number and the type of content the 
original item was, such as e-mail, document, image, etc. This 
way the investigator does not have any information regarding 
the content of the file, but a magistrate could know what kind of 
document is to be expected, as can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Exporting every file as PDF with a custom name 
In the same folder as the PDF files, a tabbed file list is 
generated containing the following fields: 
• Export Filename - Filename used for the exported file 
• NUIX GUID - Used to uniquely identify the exported file 
within the NUIX case 
• Original File Name - Original name of the file as found 
in the evidence file 
• Original File MD5 hash - MD5 digest as calculated by 
NUIX. This is done over the file in de digital evidence, 
not on the exported PDF file. 
• Original File Path - Original file path as found in the 
evidence file 
• Export status Contains the status of the file export to 
PDF. A file can appear in the file list, but not in the export 
directory as PDF. This could happen when a file could 
not be converted to PDF, such as binary files or container 
files such as ZIP 
The generated PDF files along the file list are written to the 
export folder, as can be seen in Figure 6. After this the script will 
end with a message window that informs the user that it is 
complete and the total number of privileged files that are 
processed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Exported PDF files together with a file list containing the source of 
each PDF 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
For the purpose of testing, a setup of 3 virtual machines 
containing simulated privileged communication and files were 
created. With this setup, three forensic environments are tested; 
The Nuix script, the Nuix GUI and FTK. The Nuix GUI is the 
normal interface of the Nuix Investigator Workstation in which 
the digital investigator works. Autopsy is left out of the 
comparison as cannot be used to block privileged files. The test 
case contains a total of 23 uniquely generated items. Out of these 
23, 13 unique items are privileged; the e-mails and their 
attachments from the lawyer and vice versa, together with 5 
desktop files which are duplicates from the privileged 
attachments. The results are outlined in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  TEST CASES 
 Total Privileged 
Total unique items 23 13 
Emails 14 7 
Attachments 7 4 
Desktop files 5 5 
 
The total number of unique items is not equal to the sum of 
e-mails, attachments and desktop files as some files are used 
multiple times. 
Results FTK: A filter was created within FTK that contained 
the lawyer e-mail address on the FROM and TO field. This 
resulted in the display of 20 e-mail messages. Of these 20 e-mail 
messages, 6 e-mails where unique. During the analysis of the 
results it was noted that FTK scored a high number of total items, 
but a very low number of unique e-mails in comparison to the 
Nuix GUI. After further research it was found that FTK has hit 
6 send e-mails twice in the displayed results. The double entries 
are removed from the statistics. 
FTK was unable to display attachments belonging to the 
lawyer e-mail address with any of the possible filters. Attempts 
were made together with the support of AccessData to show the 
attachments of e-mails (child items), but this was not possible 
within FTK. 
Results Nuix GUI: The privileged communication was 
found by creating a search query that uses the fields from-mail-
address and to-mail-address of the lawyer. This resulted in a total 
of 22 items, of which 10 unique. The result contains 6 privileged 
e-mails and their corresponding 4 attachments. The result is 
expected, as the 5 desktop files cannot be related to the e-mail 
communication. 
Results Nuix Script: The script is started with a shingle 
setting of 0.90 to relate only files of which their content is 
minimally 90% the same. The e-mail address of the lawyer is 
used as filter criteria. The search uses the same fields as used in 
the Nuix GUI, but an extra file relation search is run on each of 
the resulting files. 
The result is a total of 23 files are found, of which 13 unique. 
The results contain 7 e-mails and their 4 corresponding 
attachments. The script was able to filter out related files such as 
file1_1.docx, which has 5 words less than the original file1.docx 
and file1_2.pdf which is the PDF version of file1.docx based on 
their contents. 
Conclusion: In the table below are the statistics of the three 
test performed to filter on an e-mail address with a privileged 
status (Table 2). 
The Nuix script has found all (100%) unique privileged 
items in comparison to the 10 items in Nuix GUI (76.9%) and 
the 6 items by FTK (46.15%). 
Comparing the total number of found privileged items, the 
Nuix GUI finds 68.75% and FTK 43.75% of privileged items 
when compared to the Nuix script. 
TABLE II.  COMPARISON ON THE PRIVILEGES STATUS FROM THREE TESTS 
Privileged items 
( ) = unique items Nuix GUI Nuix Script FTK 
Total unique items 22(10) 23(13) 14(6) 
Emails 13(6) 15(7) 14(6) 
Attachments 9(4) 13(4) 0 
Desktop files 0 4 0 
 
Removing the overlapping items between the Nuix GUI and 
the Nuix Script presented a difference of 10 items. The Nuix 
script could find these extra 10 items with the use of applying 
file relation searches. An analysis on these items showed that: 
• E-mail 8, the forwarded e-mail to the friend, which 
originally came from the lawyer was now recognised. 
• The result included 4 files from the user’s desktop 
folders, except for File3 on the desktop on the Friend 
computer. This is a result of the fact that the script does 
not search for related files that are send to the lawyer. 
• File 2 is now included which was send in E-mail 9 to the 
Friend, which originally was flagged privileged because 
it was send from the Lawyer to the Suspect in e-mail 3. 
Based on the comparison between the Nuix GUI and Nuix 
script, the addition of the related item search based on shingles 
improved the privilege data search by 31.25% in this test case. 
The experimental results showed that the Nuix script, which 
was started with a single e-mail address as parameter, could 
thoroughly filter the privileged information. In comparison to 
the Nuix GUI and FTK, programmatically removing privileged 
items resulted in a minimum of 30% better results. This test 
indicates that extending a standard search to include file content 
relations will most likely increase the depth of the search in the 
digital evidence. 
The Nuix script ‘shields’ the person who is working on the 
privileged information from reading any content. When the Nuix 
script is started on a file or e-mail, all related files are 
automatically processed, blocked and exported. In comparison 
with the traditional way, when the filtering is done manually, the 
person may still be presented with the list of files or e-mails by 
the forensic tool after the filter is made. This list will most likely 
contain the subject of the e-mail or document. The script solves 
this problem by not requiring any interaction after the start. 
The limitation of FTK to filter on the attachments of e-mail 
communication resulted in a low 50% lower filter result for FTK 
in comparison to Nuix. This result is unexpected, as FTK is 
currently the main tool used for digital forensics and the filtering 
of privileged files. 
Out of the two tools investigated, only the commercially 
tools FTK and Nuix implemented ways to block items from 
being displayed in the interface. Both implementations are still 
inadequate, as privileged items should be fully blocked in a case 
for all users and it should be made difficult to re-add or view 
these files. 
The Nuix script can filter out privileged items as quickly as 
the software and hardware on which Nuix runs will let it. All 
steps are automated and require no human interaction after 
setting the first parameters. In large cases this could decrease the 
time required for filtering privileged items. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The results of this paper shows that digital forensic tools are 
built for extracting as much information as possible, and do a 
good job at it. But functionally they are still limited when it 
comes to blocking certain information that is legally not allowed 
to be viewed. As this is a requirement by law in many countries, 
it can be questioned if privileged information does not often 
occur in criminal investigations, it is not recognised or perhaps 
ignored, or if there are other reasons why forensic tools have 
implemented this in such a limited way. The script developed 
for Nuix as part of this paper showed in a test case an increase 
of 30% when privileged items are compared and related based 
on the content. This content based relation functionality is 
currently limited to the forensic tool Nuix, as no other tested 
forensic tools had the possibility to make such comparisons. 
This reduces the amount of privileged files law enforcement 
might still encounter after a case has been filtered for privileged 
data. We are also looking at other approaches for reducing the 
amount of files as mentioned in [24][25]. We are also extending 
our experiments on mobile devices especially focusing on digital 
forensic tools for VoIP acquisition [26] as well as examining 
privileged data in GIS application [27] and in privacy web 
browser [28]. 
The developed Nuix script in its current form can be easily 
added to Nuix and is a functional extension to the forensic tool 
fto deal with privileged information inside a Nuix case. Future 
feedback from other investigations and the different roles 
involved in the filtering process, from investigators to the 
magistrate, will be required to mature and further test the 
technical and legal requirements. 
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